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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES CREDIT 
UNION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff/Res?ondent, 
v. 
AGAPITO ESPINOZA and MARY 
ESPINOZA, 
Defendants/Appellant. 
'JC;. 
NOTICE OF NEWLY 
UNCOVERED CASE 
Case Ho. 16224 
Appellant Mary Es?inoza, by and through her attorney 
of record, Bruce Plenk of Utah Legal Services, Inc., and 
pursuant to Rule 75(p) (3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
hereby moves this Court to consider the following newly un-
covered case as an addition to her previously filed Brief in 
Support of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing. 
COSTS ON APPEAL ARE 
NOT PROPERLY Al'7ARDED 
AGAINST AN IMPECUNIOUS 
APPELLANT 
In Cody v. Cody, 47 U. 456, 154 P. 952, 956 (1916), 
this Court held that no costs on appeal should be charged 
against an appellant filing the appeal with an affidavit of 
impecuniosity. This case has never been reversed or modified 
in sixty-three years and the policy underlying the decision 
is still sound. The present case was also filed with an 
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impecunious affidavit. Thus, no costs should be awarded on 
the appeal in the event that respondent prevails. 
DATED this 2lJ1_day of iJ~ , 1979. 
UTAH ~$;AL SERVICES, INC. 
By . ~~.PU 
I BRUCE PLENK 
352 South Denver Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Mary Espinoza 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the fore-
going Notice of Newly Uncovered Case to Timothy W. Blackburn, 
Attorney for Respondent, 2605 ington Boulevard, Ogden, 
Utah 84401, this ~day of ~.J-.L~Ct~"f,~·~~·~J!,.~·~~vc____, 1979. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES CREDIT * 
UNION, A Corporation, 
* Plaintiff and 
Respondent, * 
vs. 
AGAPITO ESPINOZA and 
MARY ESPINOZA, 
Defendant and 
* Case No. 16224 
* 
* 
Appellant. * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Second Judicial 
District Court of Weber County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Ronald O. Hyde 
BRUCE PLENK, ESQ. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
352 South Denver 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
TIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN, ESQ. 
BROWNING, BLACKBURN & BALDWIN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Bank of Utah Suite 320 
2605 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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J :! ll"•t. SUPREME LULRT OF THE STATE ( 1 f UTAH 
---- ------------ -- ------------~-·-------~-----
FEU[ '<1'.J. F~l!'LfY[L·:t:S CREDIT 
::~JLCJ1:, 1\ C:o1pJration, 
l'l:iintiff and 
l'._oc,pcndcnc, 
Case tio. 1'6,224 
\!-, 1'1'~'(', :'~1-'ll,~UZ;\ and 
'!i-1kY LSI H;u/.A, 
' 
~kf-cndant and 
.\; ';1c11 ant . 
BRlEf OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
--------·----
'lbic is an <Jction brought by Respondent, who was 
th~· pl_ai,1tc_ff i.n the 10\·Hcr court, to enforce: their secured 
... ·1tcr0<;t in property pledged by AppC'llan'.:s, who werC' the 
i_ n the 1 ower courc, because of Appellants' de-
Liu LL. At}lcJIH~ property pledged were i terns which would have 
\' .... ~n '~'omp,t !Jad they not be12n pledged. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Tl1c lower court, Second Judicial District Court 
() \·cbcr C 1,)1_1,_1~y:, State of Utah, Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde 
I'· '·si cl i 11 ~. n,lcd that defendants had waived their statutory 
Is b\ pledging exempt <Jroperl:y as security, 
('id :wr have to i 11form defendant 01" the effect of 
~x~mpt rrop~rty ~nd that such action is not uncon-
)1 ,i \jJ,_t/) 11 (:' 
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court 1 s decision JS to thl v..1 n.] 'rer (.-,r (-'.At':,,-,· i_or1 1 ~ 1 gr~L, 
voluntarily pledging ex•:mpt pnipL·rty. 
STATEi·IUi'l OF FM t S 
Respondent agrees V'ith the fdc. · S~L f.}rt.-
Appellant. 
I 
·l:::BfUR IS '.'WT L. ~: r J I i ~~D '! (1 r i 1 r·~ ,, ]{ u 1 t 0 i ; 0:, 
LTr.:' ·"- '1,-.- IOt; STATUTE JF HE 1,11LUNL\El 1 1 l'ULGES Olt-:~ 
\·il5[ ~,< c_:. :·l . i\0PERTY AS S1~:cur( 1 TY FOR. A l \ )t\ l\ 
quently reco1~11ized the facl th.1L h'hc•:i ' rer ;on is c;ro11tc 
statutory rig:-it he rna•1, 
right. It is not argued hy the R(;c+on·Jent u·1~1t much ci · 
personal property plcclgeci ~i:-. 1;ecurj cy by Lhe ,\ppellJr~ 
the Promissory Note and .Sec0rily Agrecrn•.cc:t '.vhi.d· is 
subject of chis Ll\v suit would be ('xeript from .:xecc:. 
under Section 73-2 3-l \Jtc1h Cud.: /1;1notJt• ci r 1953) 'lad'· 
sec~rity not '! lwrc is ,_1u, ·.ti•.n thJ~: 
above cited statute w~1s <11·:; i ['.1\C'll by the ,.,_ .'.C)', is la tu: 
protect pe?rsons from i11\ulunt"1iJv h(:i:1" 
tain property considen,cl t" t>" ( ','.-,l 1ICj_'1 ( ( I >llC ·' ~~~'.le 
happiness· a,-,d well k·ing. I !11 l. ( h1J'· •'I 1,0 t ~ (](£ 
; 1:: ' '-, 11 l 1. 
therefore, i C, p r_- 1 Ii' I 1 ' ( 1 11 \.''· t..l ( ) I ~· ,:_: (j l .• 1 
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') ,- r r-rc:cl by the ar)ove cited stat!1tl0 • The exemp--
ii rrn la .. - 1:r r2 not intended t'.) prot:ect a person who volunta-
..; ly :-ilc:clfo'-'s '-~xempt property as stated in 31 Am. Jur. 2d 
1 ·:>~ ·c,1pt io11 laws exem:>t property oc,l_y from seizure 
""'
1 
·,alrc en mesne or final process. They are not 
d 1 ·', ~ 5".:-teu to prevent persons from giv;Lng liens 
1
-'i'O'' ',h.1te•;er property t1wy may see fit; and 
,.here such a lien is gi_ven, it crc:ates security 
,_oi_- Lhe cJ,-"J::-t in the property to ,,1rnch it attach-
1•s, fror1 wh;ch the debtor cannot relieve himself. 
r(,e lien is not discharged until the debt is 
raid: and unless there is some provision in the 
statute to the contrary, it may be enforced 
'-"i:'ainst the property to which it attaches even 
though th::it property is exempt under law. 
In the lead{ng Utah Supreme Court decision relat-
ing t:.) llL2h' s Exemµtion Statute, the high court not only 
sets forth the general rule governing a voluntary pledge of 
exempt securic;, but also sets forth some very enlightening 
&ncl logical reasoning for its decision when it said: 
"l t matters not that th2 prope1·ty may be subject 
0f such an exemption. The owner thereof may 
nevertheless sell or alienate his property of 
that nature, or any interest that he may have 
cher(·in, to rule otherwise 1rnuld have the effect 
of depriving him of part of his property rights 
1_hc:rein. Moreover, it would be repugnant to 
cl cr0e11tar_v princirles of justice to permit him to 
plcdge this propPrty to obtain $2,500.00 from the 
!Jcnik and then try to defeat the bank's claim by 
'SsLrting that he had no right to make the 
"ledoc. Clearf-\.eld State Bank v. Contos. 562 P. 
2-i 6°2'.l ,62),TIYT!. 
Respondent submits that it is the responsibility, 
an.i indeed thE" duty of che legislature to protect what it 
'-'"";i,i:·cs to be general priorities regarding property pos-
- 3-
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session in this s ta Le. 
Exemption Statute. 
ment upon the rights of the citizens of Ls st1tl• for 
courts to ir,terpret Sec ti on 78-23-1 crtL•h ·_:ode Anno•:~l 
(1953) so strictly as to prevent th·2 \-c,l1c;1L·iry alic-nati 
of the property described therein. 
voluntarily pledge othenvise .cxen.pl ;iroµerty is l 0-111 secu:-
ity removes none of his o>L1tutury righ<:-- _ 
allows him the freedom to [Jri1irLti_zc l~i~ ,1•-.n pu'''ESs: 
~nd ~rovides him the opporlunity o, in ~ffer_: 
are more important to ~c thiln the use 
pro-perty." 
In addressing a problem very :oi r- ! Jar to the :· 
brought in issue by the AppclL1Jtt, ~;-,e Cine) Supreri•2 Co1:· 
placed the burden wbcre it propc1·lv bc:lc~n;~:; ""hen .'.t sai. 
" if this Statute is to include: e:<ccuc._•r_: 1- ai_vers ·. · t'-
change in the law shouJ cl be accclrnpl is ned through un;· 
biguous legislature enactment." Cit)' L"iln ,nd Savings G.:: 
v. Keenan 136 Ohio 125, 24 r;.1:. 2d, 452, 4-,,_, (lCJ39J. lr,c: 
past, the Utah Legislilt11rc ha:c [J,_·en ·;e1·y ,_-a1·cful t:o 
cribe \·Jhat it feels n1u:ol i'.- full·; r! i "Clo: c d l:c) borro»:c---
This is evidenced 
ments found in Lhe t'ni !: c-Y 11~~-1rr1cr r~-1_-. 1 1 l Cc.clc·, Sc"ti 
7 0 B 2 - 301 ct seq . l' . C . / . 
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Lhis st;icc plc;ce no disclosure responsi2ility upon credit-
·>1··; 1Jhe11 g·rantic1 0° 'oans and taki'n th · , '- · g o C'nn.se exempt pro-
riccty a~ security. 
Appellant's argument that waivers regarding 
right'; under the Exemption Statute must be "knowingly and 
i;1tel l i:;c'ntly r::ade" is, in this case, simply not supported 
) 
l>\ legal logic. The general rule is as follows " ... an 
c>.prcs,, '"'·Jiver is not necessary for a mortgage or pledge 
35 C.J.S., Exemptions Section 106, See 
!~'::'__:___..::_1.:_r:.__l~~, 178 L.A. 637, 152 So. 315, 316 (1933); U.S. 
Rui_ldin__r,__.J:Kl Loan Association v. Stevens, 9:?. l'-iont. 11, 17 P 
2c'. .6/, ( 1932) City Loan and Savings Co., v. Kennen 136 Ohio 
St. l2:i, 24 N.E. 2cl 452 (1939). Since the law allows for 
_ n1pli,~ci waivE'rs to be mi!de with regard to exemption stat-
ute:;, it would be illogical to simultaneously require a 
creclitor tl) obtain a "knOl>'ing and intelligent waiver". 
S1..ch a rt:ql!i rement 1vould place the waiver in the category 
01 ex µc e s :; . It 1'1ould further place an undue burden upon 
creditors, 2ud place at issue in all security agreemet;t 
r:·scs th2 problems c.nd _iudgm·2nts associated with a loan 
of[ic,1-'s assurance that a debtor knowing and intelligently 
i.vc~rl his ri6hts. Until such time as the legislature 
l' c- ta 1- J is hl' s reason<Jblc and systematic method whereby a 
crc_dit·oc 1c.:;\ ,:,btain 211 exr1.'css 1,1aiver of a debtor's exernp-
lio11 ri;;hcs, the courts anc wise in allo1dng fo1: an implied 
-5--
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Tf-lE FACT THAT A CR1-:DlTOR DOE:S l~lil' I id-(JHt·l P. lJE.BTi.' 
OF THE EXE~lPlLON l:\c) \~Lli 1\\11 i'L\Ki: A S~CU1~ll'1 :,r:;:[,··· 
UNCONSCIONABU:. 
D'?fendant's cl.,ir;· ,f unconscic•nahi_lit\· of'.': 
agreement pursuant to Utah C,lde Annotated Sect Len iOtl-'i-i 
is without merit. In the comment of commis:-ioners on 1.ni-
form State Laws, which follows Utah Code Arn1ocaced Sc:c':L-: 
708-5-108~ it sets forth the basic test . 
. . . the basic test is v.'hcthcr, in light of the 
background and setting uf the macl·.ect, thv corr .• ~.e­
cial needs of the particular track clr case, an: 
the condition of tr1e part.i.cular rtics to the 
contract, the contract or clau<c.cs nvulved ares: 
one-sided as to be unconscilJncibic under the cir-
r·umstances existing at che tir::e uf t 11e making c' 
che contract ... " 
Fl:.rther, the C<)urt in \Jillii1n;•; v. \falker-Thor:·ri· 
Furn. Co. 350 F. 2d 445 '.il.C. Cii-. 1065! ~t:i.:t:s that "i~ir,-
conscionability has generally been re·:og,,i_7,r".l i:o i«ciuce 
absence of meaningful choice un thl' p·irt of nne of c,, 
parties together with conlr:ic:t termc, 11hich :.re unreaso.1a~;-
Wentz 172 F 2d 80 [3rd Cir. [Yl8]1 
\.ihether a me..!nin:;fr,J cho'!.ce is r,,-,,,,,,:it: i11 a parli-
cular case can only be: del:cc-minl'c1 by co1i:. i d·c:Jt i•Jn of jl: 
the circumscances surroundin;~ tl1:c tca11s0ct:i,_;n. l!l the C3S' 
at b th f 1 ' <',,_,f,;ndants 1,i.·2rt ar ere ai-e no ;ict', i,1<icatinf', L11,1t ~ 
!, -
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ctpprccidtin;: tne clc·cuments ".hich they ~igned. The trial 
jll(lgc 1vh·.J hcJ.d the opportunily to listen to the testimony 
tr1c clct<'rmination that c1efemL1nts ''.ere capable of 
1;r;d.2rstn.nd ell le, trie consequences of their <1Ctions and had not 
l;c en I akc'll ·1d· anta;;c of in this c.:ise. 
'l :w coll iLeral gi·JL'n to secure the loan was dis-
· 1 oseJ co .-,.,f,?ndant;o. and Lh2y were defi_nit2ly aware of what 
·•,uld ha1•i;icri in the event of dcL1ult:. 
,\c' to rcaEonable11c'"'' or fairnesE., Corbin suggests 
th'" tc,sl. as b2ing whc:ther the terms are "so extreme as to 
11 pear l,;1conscionable according to the mores and business 
;· -,_,, tices of the tiIT:e .:i01d plac2." l Corbin, Contracts 
~cction 128 (1963). 
IL can hardly be: said that from the circumstances 
surr~unding the transaction involved here, this transaction 
1v0\1ld be c 1.cvated to the level of unconscionability AS 
3rgucd by defendant. While defendant argues that taking of 
ronpurch3se money security interests in exempt household 
:·.-,.,~ds has been ''1vidE:ly" condemned as unconscionable yet 
1nci'.r.ate;, u12t "::it lea':: four suites" hc.v2 legislatively 
7·.,lloi·L'd ll:is ipproach. This could ha-cdly be vie1.'ed as 
11 ·,·~dcl,,.' 1 '-'Ulider:1ning this i:iractice. 
CONCLUsro:; 
Sc•ci:ion 73-~3--l Uuh Code Ar.notatecl (1953) can be 
i -~ c 0 t _: on . 
''• SC \)I IJLcJl1 L11>' dealing 1dth exe,nption rights. The 
- 7-
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exemption statute is des i E~ncd to pn>tcc l iudgment <J,2btc: 
against involuntarily losing thei_r poss,::s:;.-ff'.i rights, <ird 
voluntary pledging of pro1,erty JS 10:111 sc,urity. Tc i:1c,:.-
pret the Exemption Statute as suggcc,tcd l'y the Ai:pdL-,, 
would defer legislative rc,;ponsibilit:\• tu ~ne courts and t; 
grantors of loans. Appellants implied \!diver being valid, 
this court should finrl th2t Respondent pos;c.csses i1 ,· 0 \iJ 
in A[>pcllant's property ari 
ed by thc: Utah Consumer Credit Cock·, Section 70B-3-!U4 et, 
seq; U.C.A. (1953l. 
Fur::hermorc, ti< is c_uurt sh.)uld find that ui'\cic'. 
the circumstances of this cict~on, t:h,_ t:1:zin[, of the SL<·J-
rity was not unconscionJblc ancl ;'.llow plaintiff t0 enforct 
it's contractual remedies under the ngrceMent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CEPTIFlC11.TE r;f ,'.i/\[Ll:1C 
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1 :1e .'\Llnrr1cy I cir Appel lwnt ., Bruce Plenk, Utah Legal Sec-
vice<; li<c. ~)52 South Denvei-, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on 
~l1~s the 4 clay of April, 1979. 
~Ca!J·ia 
ecretary 
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